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REVIEWS 
The Review Section of E&A consists of three parts. The first is made up of 
brief reviews of books and articles (and perhaps films, etc.) that are concerned 
in some way with the rights and wrongs of human treatment of non-human ani­
mals. The second part of this Section is entitled 'Replies' and contains comments 
on or responses to reviews published in earlier issues of E&A. By letter the 
Editor invites the authors of works reviewed to respond, and by this proclama­
tion in each issue invites all other interested readers to submit comments. The 
third part of the Reviews Section is a list of works of which reviews are invited. 
Any member who wishes to review any work in this continuing 'Reviews Needed' 
list should contact the Editor. 
Stephen Wal ker, 
(London: Routledge 
Walker summarizes the argument of 
his�	 book in the following words: 
Human thought is intimately 
connected with the activities of 
the human brain; other verte­
brate animals apart from our­
selves have very complicated 
brains, and in some cases 
brains which appear to be 
physically very much like our 
own; this suggests that what 
goes on in animals brains has a 
good deal in common with what 
goes on in human brains; and 
laboratory experiments on ani­
mal behaviou r provide some 
measure of support for this 
suggestion (p. xiii). 
His conclusion is that 
it makes sense to suppose that 
awareness and mental organiza­
tion occur in animals, without 
the involvement of language 
(xiii) . 
The book is divided into three 
parts. The first three chapters pro­
vide a history of philosophical and 
psychological theories concerning ani­
mal thought. Chapter 1 is devoted to 
the philosophers. It focuses on Des­
cartes, naturally, but also contains 
summaries of the Aristotlean-Aquinian 
position against which Descartes was 
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working and of the Lockean, Humean, 
and Schopenhauerean positions devel­
oped in opposition to Descartes. 
Chapter 2 deals with Darwin and some 
of the nineteenth century thinkers he 
influenced, Romanes, Huxley, Marx, 
Engels, and Lloyd Morgan. Chapter 3 
deals with twentieth centu ry theories 
of animal thought, ranging from 
Thorndi ke and Pavlov th rough Watson, 
Tolman, and Skinner to Piaget, Grif­
fin, and MacKintosh. 
All Walker's summaries in these 
three chapters are lucid, well-fo­
cused, and engaging. Chapters 2 and 
3 will be of particular interest to 
those, like myself, who are basically 
ignorant of the history of psychology. 
For example, I was surprised to learn 
that psychological experiments on ani­
mals were begun in reaction against 
Darwinian theorists and the field 
studies they employed. E. L. Thorn­
dike, "who introduced the laboratory 
experiment into an imal psychology, . . 
pointed out that previous authors 
had paid much more attention to ani­
mal intelligence than to animal stupid­
ity. Thorndi ke's tone th roughout is 
that of a man who is going to remedy 
this omission" (61). Also surprising, 
at least to me, was the split between 
psychologists, such as Wal ker, who 
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are sympathetic to the idea of animal 
intelligence on the basis of physiologi­
cal evolution and ethologists, such as 
Griffl n (The Question of Animal 
Awareness), who are sympathetic to 
this idea on the basis of animal 
behavior. Walker tends to discount 
ethological studies of intelligent animal 
behavior, such as Griffin's study of 
the language of the honey bee, when 
the claimed intelligence of the behav­
ior does not correspond to an appro­
priate level of brain development. It 
would seem that philosophical pre­
commitments remain alive and well in 
animal psychology. 
The second section of the book is 
devoted to physiological evidence con­
cerning animal intelligence. Chapter 4 
deals with the sequence and relations 
in vertebrate brain evolution. Chap­
ter 5 deals with the fu nctions of the 
various parts of the vertebrate brain 
and the conservation or change of 
functions as the structu re of the 
brain evolves. Chapter 6 discusses 
these functions and their evolution in 
the life and su rvival of an imals. 
Walker summarizes the conclusion of 
these physiological chapters as fol­
lows: 
I have supported the idea that 
the functions of the different 
divisions of the brain are more 
or less the same in all verte­
brates, and that therefore we 
should expect the functions of 
intelligence, thought, and cog­
nition to be present roughly in 
proportion to how well the for­
ebrain seems to be developed. 
A fish, frog, or lizard does 
not have very much by way of 
cerebral hemispheres, and 
should therefore have very lit­
tle cognition. But this little is 
a much more generous allow­
ance than that given by other 
theories, which say that such 
forebrain as is present in 
non-mammals is not used for 
cogn ition, or attention, or 
learning, at all, but is only 
there to respond to smells, or 
to program primitive instincts. 
These other theories are prob­
ably wrong (192-193). 
Thus, Walker sees physiology sup­
porting something like the "difference 
of degree" approach to animal vs. 
human thought favored by Locke and 
Hume, rather than the "difference in 
kind" (if it makes and sense to talk of 
animal thought at all) approach 
favored by Descartes and many con­
temporary, neo-Cartesian opponents of 
animal rights (e.g., R. G. Frey, 
Interests and Rights). 
The third section of the book is 
devoted to psychological studies of 
an imal thought. Chapter 7 concerns 
the cognitive dimensions of animal 
perception. Chapter 8 deals with ani­
mal memory, and Chapter 9 discusses 
symbolic awareness, communication, 
and attempts to teach apes human lan­
guages. 
Not su rprisingly, Walker finds that 
the psychological evidence confi rms 
the "difference of degree" position 
supported by· the physiological evi­
dence. In the case of perception, 
if a bi rd sees a tree as some­
thing which can be flown 
around and possibly landed on 
and nested in, the argument is 
that this requires a perceptual 
schema of some complexity, 
which may be closer to an 
expressible verbal concept than 
to a succession of instinctive 
responses to exactly prepro­
grammed sensations (284). 
Turning to memory, 
If the perceptual apparatus of 
an an imal is used to construct 
descriptions of what is per­
ceived, in order to detect 
objects and things rather than 
isolated sensations, then one 
would certainly expect continu­
ity and discontin uity with time 
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to be a necessary part of the 
descriptions. However, more 
complicated brains would be 
heeded to construct such 
descriptions, and to store them 
over time, than would be 
needed· to react to a simple 
stimulus, such as a bright 
light, and to modify reactions 
according to whether previous 
reactions to bright Iights had 
been strengthened by the ing­-
estion of food, or such like. 
There is reason to believe that 
the cerebral hemispheres of 
vertebrate brains are particu­-
larly important for, among 
other things, the utilisation of 
memories as opposed to such 
simple habits (337-338) . 
Concerning language, Walker is 
inclined to deny that Washoe and the 
other signing apes have learned a 
human language, because of the mini­-
mal grammar in their communications. 
As might be expected, he favors an 
evolutionary view of non-human 
nea r-Ia nguages: 
Whatever the sources and 
stages in the evol ution of 
human language, there remain 
sufficient similarities between 
human and animal brain func­-
tion to allow for comparison. 
The similarities depend on the 
assumption that animal brains 
are devices for selecting and 
organising perceived informa­-
tion, and that the neu ral sys­-
tems which accomplish percep­-
tion and memory exhibit 
evolutionary continuity. Beha­-
vioural data support the con­-
tention that mental organisation 
exists in animals, in particular 
in non-human primates, as a 
necessary part of the percep-
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tion of objects and their locali­-
sation and interrelationships in 
space and time. It does not 
seem unreasonable to suppose, 
therefore, that the development 
of the distinctively human 
capacity for language took 
place via the deployment of the 
same forms of mental organisa­-
tion for new pu rposes 
(380-391) . 
In conclusion, Walker's book pro­-
vides a good crash course in the his­-
tory, physiology, and psychology of 
animal thought. Since animal rights 
philosophers and advocates are often 
dismissed by scientists as being woe­-
fully ignorant of the facts about ani­-
mal mental capacities, reading this 
book can be recommended as a con­-
venient way of catching such detrac­-
tors by surprise and making them eat 
their words. However, at the begin­-
ning of Animal Thought, Walker says 
that he has "deliberately avoided the 
question of how theories of animal 
psychology might impinge on opinions 
about our moral responsibilities 
towards animals" (xiii); so, this book 
contains no ethical theory or conclu­-
sions. This book does contain sum­-
maries and analyses of many experi­-
ments involving the deprivation, 
mutilation, and killing of animals 
which are exemplary of the idle curi­-
osities which animal physiologists and 
psychologists call "science". Many 
readers will, consequently, find parts 
of this book thoroughly distasteful. 
One can only hope that the argument 
developed in Animal Thought wi II come 
to impinge on our moral responsibili­-
ties to animals, so that the pointless 
suffering of animals reported in its 
pages may thereby finally come to 
some good purpose. 
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